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Comment
Can Lawyers Wear Blinders? Gatekeepers and
Third-Party Opinions
John C. Coffee, Jr.*
The question in the title may seem to answer itself. But it does not; indeed,
the question has been framed to explain my difficulty with Professor Schwarcz's
position on third-party opinions. Frankly, Steven Schwarcz has taken a bold,
tough position. Addressing what he sees as issues of "first impression," he asks
"what it means for lawyers to issue legal opinions that create negative
externalities,"1 and "[i]f lawyers issuing legal opinions owe a duty to the public
as well as to the opinion recipient."2 These are large, possibly even imponderable
questions, but he answers them crisply and succinctly in the manner of a classic
legal positivist: So long as "the lawyers neither know nor should know that their
opinions will be used to facilitate an accounting fraud,",3 they may deliver legally
accurate opinions, even if they will thereby mislead investors. In short, lawyers
may wear blinders, but they must stop and end their assistance the moment they
recognize a fraud is afoot. In the wake of Enron and much evidence of the abuse
of "special purpose entities" and off-balance-sheet accounting, asserting this
minimalist position requires some courage and conviction. But Professor
Schwarcz thinks much is at stake, including the "very viability of the entire
structured-finance industry. ' 4
Although I agree with much that he says about the insufficiency of a
negative externalities standard, we part company essentially over whether the
attorney delivering a third-party opinion has any affirmative obligation to inquire
into the transaction's legitimacy. Professor Schwarcz has essentially made the
case--cogently and incisively-for letting lawyers employ a tunnel vision. In
his view, only if they are alerted by red flags or warning signals does a duty
commence. In contrast, I believe that the attorney's role in this special context of
third-party opinions is fundamentally that of a gatekeeper-a role that is midway
between that of the attorney as advocate and that of the auditor. Unlike an
attorney who is simply representing a client, an attorney acting as a gatekeeper
becomes a reputational intermediary on whom third parties may reasonably rely,
and hence more can be expected of such an attomey.
* Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
1. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Limits of Lawyering: Legal Opinions in Structured Finance, 84
TEXAS L. REv. 1, 7 (2005).
2. 1d.
3. Id. at 6 n.26.
4. Id. at 8.
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But how much more is not an easy question. This brief comment
focuses not on the normal relationship between attorney and client, but on the
very different relationship between an attorney who is retained by a client to
give an opinion to third parties who will forseeably rely upon it. In my
judgment, the existing system for delivering third-party opinions
underperformed and became dysfunctional in the 1990s-for reasons that
were entirely predictable. Although the principal reasons for this breakdown
are not attributable to attorneys, an attorney wearing the blinders that
Professor Schwarcz would permit is an impediment to capital market
efficiency because the attorney's conduct will predictably produce investor
confusion and capital market mispricing. To explain my concerns, I need to
begin by supplementing the very useful description of the legal landscape
that Professor Schwarcz has supplied. Other key actors need to be identified
and their interactions with attorneys understood.
I. A Scorecard of the Players
Professor Schwarcz models the opinion-giving process in terms of three
participants: (1) the attorney; (2) the client; and (3) the third-party recipient.
But the system is more complex, and it depends upon protocols that were
developed by other actors.
A. The Law Firm
In structured-finance transactions (and in many other forms of finance),
attorneys act not simply as experts, but as gatekeepers. By this latter term I
mean that the law firm issuing a third-party opinion is a reputational inter-
mediary that is credible precisely because the law firm is pledging
reputational capital that the law firm has developed over much time and
many clients.5 By placing this capital at risk, the law firm implicitly assures
the recipient of its opinion that it would be irrational for the law firm to de-
ceive the recipient because the law firm would lose more in reputational
capital than it could possibly gain in client fees from a single transaction.
This is a specific application of a strategy that Oliver Williamson has de-
scribed as "hostage taking",;6 one's statements are made credible if and to the
extent that one has placed at risk of forfeiture assets having greater value
than the revenue expected from one's client.
Third-party opinions are but one example of gatekeeper intermediary
services that the capital markets use to assure investors and thus reduce the
5. For a fuller definition of the concept of gatekeeper and a review of the relevant literature, see
John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant
Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 308-09 (2004).
6. Cf Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchanges, 73
AM. ECON. REV. 519, 519-20 (1983). Although Williamson is focused largely on "transaction
specific" assets, reputational capital has some similar characteristics in that it is useful only to the
practicing professional.
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cost of capital. Auditors, securities analysts, investment banks, credit rating
agencies-these are the best known other examples of gatekeepers providing
certification and verification services to investors. Yet, precisely for this
reason, the solo attorney cannot play the role of gatekeeper and cannot give
an opinion that will be accepted by sophisticated third parties. Why not?
Because the individual attorney has little reputational capital and thus can
seldom pledge anything of greater value than this attorney stands to gain
from the transaction. Basically, only to the extent that a law firm hired by a
client stands to lose more than it can gain from the transaction by deceiving
investors can investors trust them.
Thus, whereas Professor Schwarcz focuses on the attorney, I will focus
on the law firm. To be sure, legal ethics (and ethicists) have
characteristically focused on the individual attorney,7 but this is an artificial
convention that obscures the actual dynamics of most transactions and
enables the bar to duck the nastier questions of collective knowledge. Third-
party opinions are given by a collective entity-the law firm. My preference
for using the law firm as the basic unit of analysis stems in part from the fact
that law firms often possess collective knowledge vastly exceeding that of
the individual attorney. This collective knowledge can supply a basis for
criticizing the law firm's performance, even if the individual attorney has
behaved with complete innocence of that knowledge.
Prevailing law does subject the opinion-giving attorney to liability to the
third party for negligent misrepresentation,8 but law firms face a relatively
low risk of liability under Rule lOb-5 for statements made in their opinions.9
In general, the more that attorneys qualify their opinions, the less that they
face liability on either basis. As a result, for at least the largest firms, the
7. Some ethicists have recognized the need for codes that apply to the firm as a whole. See,
e.g., Richard W. Painter, Rules Lawyers Play By, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 665, 732 (2001).
8. The cases recognizing that the law firm can be held liable to a nonclient for negligent
misrepresentation are relatively recent-all within the last twenty years. See, e.g., Greycas, Inc. v.
Proud, 826 F.2d 1560, 1565 (7th Cir. 1987); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby,
Palmer & Wood, 605 N.E.2d 318, 322 (N.Y. 1992). As discussed infra subpart I(E), structured-
finance legal opinions are typically so qualified that the recipient cannot reasonably seek to hold the
attorney liable in malpractice because of the occurrence of legal consequences to which the attorney
clearly adverted in the opinion.
9. See, e.g., Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 776, 779-84 (3d Cir. 1985) (requiring that the
plaintiff show that the opinion was given "with a lack of a 'genuine belief that the information
disclosed was accurate and complete in all material respects"'); Kline v. First W. Gov't Sec. Inc.,
794 F. Supp. 542, 550-51 (E.D. Pa. 1992), aff'd in part and revd in part, 24 F.3d 480, 492 (3d Cir.
1994) (holding that the plaintiffs stated a Rule lob-5 claim against the law firm based on statements
in an opinion letter); Stevens v. Equidyne Extractive Indus., 694 F. Supp. 1057, 1064 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) (same). Because liability under Rule lOb-5 requires proof of scienter, which must be well-
pleaded with particularity at the outset of the action and must raise a "strong inference of fraud" in
order for the action to survive a motion to dismiss under Section 21D(b)(2) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, the securities laws do not provide a remedy against the attorney who is only
negligent-unless that negligence rises to the level of subjective awareness of and indifference to
the risks, at which point the attorney may be called "reckless."
2005]
Texas Law Review
reputational injury may be of greater concern than the prospect of civil
liability. °
B. Bar Associations
The conventions applicable to third-party opinions are relatively new
(as Professor Schwarcz recognizes).1" But at each step in the development of
these conventions, the bar associations have acted to minimize the attorney's
obligations and the burdens that should be placed on the attorney. Thus, the
TriBar Committees have downsized the attorney's opinion and declared it to
be "merely a lawyer's informed judgment as to a specific question of law."' 2
Similarly, the TriBar Committees have sought to protect attorneys by ruling
some issues off-limits and declaring it "inappropriate to seek to require an
unqualified opinion on an uncertain or disputed legal principle.' 3 At first
glance, this regulatory edict may seem surprising because presumably
sophisticated parties could bargain over the degree of assurance and certainty
that the attorney is to express.
The bar associations' efforts to insulate attorneys should not be
surprising; after all, their constituency is attorneys, not clients. By analogy,
letting bar associations prescribe the rules for opinions is equivalent to
allowing the American Medical Association to specify the tort law principles
applicable to medical malpractice actions. Functionally, bar associations op-
erate much like cartels. That is, just as the medieval guild screened out the
worst performers of its profession, but suppressed competition among its
10. A distinction needs to be drawn here between the liability of the corporation's principal
outside counsel and that of counsel for a specific transaction only. The liability of the former may
be substantially greater than that of a special counsel who is addressing only the context of
structured finance. The Enron litigation suggests this, and it represents the current high water mark
of professional liability, because Judge Harmon's decision effectively resurrected "aiding and
abetting" liability under a new name. See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235
F. Supp. 2d 549, 591 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (citing Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir. 1997))
(noting that, although a plaintiff could not bring an aiding and abetting claim against secondary
actors such as lawyers under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, this did not preclude
a finding of liability against secondary actors where such secondary actors "acted together to violate
the securities laws, as long as each defendant committed a manipulative or deceptive act in
furtherance of the scheme"). Even if this case were followed by other courts, counsel acting
exclusively as structured-finance counsel do not face the same prospect of liability under it as do
Enron's principal outside counsel. This is shown by the fact that Judge Harmon dismissed the
Enron complaint against Kirkland & Ellis, which did not serve as Enron's counsel, but rather
represented Enron's special purpose entities. See id. at 705-06.
11. The first significant writing on legal opinions dates back only a little over thirty years. See
James J. Fuld, Legal Opinions in Business Transactions-An Attempt to Bring Order Out of Chaos,
28 Bus. LAW. 914 (1973). Only this year did a new ABA Committee-the Committee on Legal
Opinions, ABA Section of Business Law-publish its first "annual review" of this field. See
Committee on Legal Opinions, ABA Section of Business Law, Annual Review of the Law on Legal
Opinions, 60 Bus. LAW. 1057 (2005) [hereinafter Annual Review of the Law on Legal Opinions].
12. Special Committee on Legal Opinions in Commercial Transactions, New York County
Lawyers' Association et al., Legal Opinions to Third Parties: An Easier Path, 34 BuS. LAW. 1891,
1896 (1979).
13. Id at 1895.
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remaining members, so too does the contemporary bar association seek to
protect its members from both liability and competition by ruling it
"inappropriate" to ask for certain forms of opinions.
14
Viewed in this light, it was predictable that bar associations would
work diligently (as they have) to simplify the process of opinion-giving,
making it more streamlined and routinized. Yet, by protecting their
members, the bar associations could potentially cause legal opinions to say
so little of substance as to provide little informational value to their
recipients. But here, the real irony surfaces: the principal recipients, as next
discussed, often want and need legal opinions, not for the information they
communicate, but for the insurance policy they provide. Even if the opinion
is so highly qualified as to be of limited value, it still may help to justify
conclusions that the opinion recipient needs to reach for ulterior reasons and
to protect them from liability.
C. The Ratings Agencies
Structured finance is ratings driven. Absent a rating, the debt of a
special purpose entity (SPE) is unmarketable. In any issuance of asset-
backed securities, ratings agencies must know both that there has been a
"true sale" of the assets (usually receivables) and that the financing vehicle
cannot be consolidated with the parent on the latter's bankruptcy. 15 But the
ratings agencies constitute an oligopoly: Moody's and Standard & Poor's
dominate the U.S. market, with Fitch a weak third. 16  Moreover, because
long-established conventions require an issuer to secure two ratings (in order
to restrict opinion shopping by issuers for the least demanding rater), there is
little need for the two dominant firms to compete with each other.
Although the rating agencies do not truly compete, they might still rep-
resent demanding consumers of legal opinions (because they are
sophisticated repeat players) if they faced a significant risk of liability for
their ratings. But they do not. The simple truth is that ratings agencies have
14. For a relevant example, discussed further infra at notes 19-20, see ABA Task Force on
Securities Law Opinions, Negative Assurance on Securities Offerings, 59 BUS. LAW. 1513 (2004).
That ABA report has sought to limit the occasions on which "negative assurances" can be requested
from counsel, concluding that "[a] request for negative assurance is appropriate only when it is
requested for that purpose .. "-i.e., "to assist the opinion recipient in establishing a due diligence
or similar defense." Id at 1513-14. In short, in other contexts, the bar, acting very much like a
classic cartel, is decreeing that its members should not be asked for negative assurances. This
makes life easier for lawyers, but may deprive investors in a host of similar contexts (e.g., mergers
and acquisitions) of valuable information.
15. See Richard E. Mendales, Looking Under the Rock: Disclosure of Bankruptcy Issues Under
the Securities Laws, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 731, 774-75 (1996) (stating that rating agencies require an
opinion from the issuer's counsel regarding the sale of the assets and the potential for consolidation
of the SPE upon bankruptcy of the parent prior to issuing investment-grade ratings).
16. For an overview of this industry, see Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82
WASH. U. L.Q. 43 (2004), and Claire A. Hill, Rating Agencies Behaving Badly: The Case of Enron,
35 CONN. L. REV. 1145, 1146-47 (2003). For a special focus on why the ratings system ignores
important information, see Mendales, supra note 15, at 752-53.
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not yet been held liable (either under the federal securities laws or at
common law) by third parties who rely on their ratings.1 7 Indeed, the ratings
agencies claim that their monosyllabic ratings constitute First Amendment
protected speech.' 8 Thus, facing limited competition and even less liability,
they are free to enjoy the quiet life and need not engage in much due
diligence. In turn, this means that they need not question or closely review
the law firm giving them an opinion in the structured-finance context. For
them, even if the legal opinion expresses little information of substantive
value because of its extensive qualifications, its timely receipt should still be
sufficient to relieve them of any potential liability for negligence.
In this respect, the ratings agencies contrast sharply with underwriters in
the equity offering context, who do face real liability under the federal
securities laws and real competition. Because of these real risks that
underwriters face, they are normally demanding consumers of third-party
opinions, at least in the initial public offering context.19 To illustrate, in a
public offering, the underwriter will insist that the issuer's counsel give it a
Rule lob-5 opinion.20  This opinion is in truth less a legal opinion than a
representation. It certifies that the law firm is not aware of any material
misrepresentation or omission by its client in the registration statement.
Such a negative assurance may sound strange, but it is a sensible way of
reducing information asymmetries. Counsel is assuring the recipient of the
17. For a review of the case law, see Gregory Husisian, Note, What Standard of Care Should
Govern the World's Shortest Editorials?: An Analysis of Bond Rating Agency Liability, 75
CORNELL L. REV. 411 (1996); see also Mendales, supra note 15, at 753 (noting that, although the
rating agencies' practice of collecting fees from issuers could subject them to liability, opposition
from the courts and from Congress likely will shield the agencies from legal pressure to perform
complete and accurate work); Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two
Thumbs Down for the Credit-Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 641 n.97 (2001) (discussing
the case law regarding lawsuits filed against rating agencies for failure to anticipate defaults or other
credit problems). United States District Judge Melinda Harmon recently dismissed a variety of
actions brought against the credit ratings agencies that rated Enron. Newby v. Enron Corp., No. H-
01-3624, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4494, at *252 (S.D. Tex. May 24, 2005).
18. See Jefferson County School Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody's Investor Servs., Inc., 988 F. Supp.
1341, 1348 (D. Colo. 1997) (holding that a rating agency's unsolicited opinion on the credit
worthiness of bonds is protected by the First Amendment), aff'd, 175 F.3d 848 (10th Cir. 1999).
19. This is the context in which the "negative assurance" opinion developed. Underwriters are
demanding consumers in this context, largely because they face presumptive liability under § 11 of
the Securities Act of 1933. Also, in an IPO, the underwriter enjoys an extended relationship with
the issuer that effectively prevents the issuer from replacing the underwriter once the offering
process has begun. In contrast, the underwriter in a registered structured-finance transaction can be
replaced (at least in the next transaction) and thus has less leverage over the client.
20. For descriptions of this standard opinion, see ABA Task Force on Securities Law Opinions,
supra note 14; Richard R. Howe, The Duties and Liabilities of Attorneys in Rendering Legal
Opinions, 1989 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 283, 287; and Richard W. Painter, Toward a Market for
Lawyer Disclosure Services: In Search of Optimal Whistleblowing Rules, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
221, 226-27 n. 19 (1995). Cf Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills
and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 275 (1984) (explaining that any significant acquisition
agreement requires, as a condition to the buyer's obligation to complete the transaction, that the
buyer receive an opinion of the seller's counsel with respect to a substantial number of items).
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opinion that it is aware of no material information that has been withheld or
misstated by its client, and given counsel's status as a reputational
intermediary, its assurance is worth more than its client's assurance.
D. The Accountants
Accounting firms are the other major player relying on third-party
opinions in structured-finance transactions. But accountants are not residual
risk bearers; rather, to them, the attorney's opinion represents a form of in-
surance that enables them to give their client the accounting treatment that it
desires. Receiving such an opinion may protect them even if it is wrong, and
hence they too are undemanding consumers. Equally important, accountants
hear a different message than the opinion-giving law firm truly expresses.
The law firm opines, for example, that a transaction is a "true sale," but the
accountant hears that no debt associated with the transferred assets need be
shown on the originator's financial statements. A basic disconnect exists
here between what the law firm opines and what the accountants conclude
from the law firm's opinion, but the relationship is nonetheless a direct
cause-and-effect one.
Unlike opinions to the underwriter in the equity public offering context
(where the opinion provides a due-diligence protection for the underwriters),
the attorney's opinion to the originator's accountants in a structured-finance
transaction supplies the principal rationale for the desired accounting treat-
ment that motivates the corporation to enter the structured-finance
transaction. Enron showed clearly that the originator's desire to "clean up"
its financial statements by moving significant liabilities off its balance sheet
can be the motive for a structured-finance transaction, not a lower cost of
debt.2' Thus, more reason exists for the attorney to inquire into the
transaction's legitimacy before delivering so sensitive an opinion. Also, a
law firm handling many transactions for the same originator may be well
aware of this and of the overall impact on the originator's financial
statements.
E. The Opinion Itself
As Professor Schwarcz acknowledges, the opinions given in
structured-finance transactions are uniquely long and heavily qualified. As
he observes, a typical opinion "resembles. .. a mini-treatise, comprising 40-
60 single-spaced pages., 22 If a corporate borrower were to try and deliver
such a qualified opinion to a bank in a standard loan transaction with regard
21. InIn re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 610 (S.D. Tex.
2002), Judge Harmon found that allegations that Enron created special purpose entities in order to
shift its debt from itself to these entities for the purpose of hiding its liabilities were adequate to
plead scienter and state a Rule lob-5 violation. Nor does the Enron case stand alone; Dynergy, Inc.
has had a similar experience. See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
22. See Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 6 n.28.
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to the enforceability of the loan agreement's provisions, the bank would
likely not accept it and would refuse to close. Instead, the bank would
demand a simple, unequivocal conclusion that the loan agreement was
enforceable against the borrower according to its terms.
Why are the characteristic opinions so different in the structured-finance
context? First, bankruptcy law has real uncertainties, and therefore some
equivocation in "true sale" opinions may be necessary.23
But this is not the entire explanation. Second, the context of structured
finance does not have the same adversarial bargaining as a loan transaction
because often the negotiating parties are not truly at arm's length. This
permits law firms, uniquely in this context, to deliver heavily qualified
opinions that drone on endlessly like second-rate law review articles. Both
sides get what they truly want. The law firm anticipates that its extensive
qualifications will protect it from liability. Correspondingly, the accountants
and rating agencies perceive themselves as receiving a substantial degree of
protection from the attorney's opinion; in effect, they are obtaining not
information, but insurance. But the ultimate party relying on the attorney as
gatekeeper-the investor-gains little.
F. Summary
Why do the ratings agencies and accounting firms not ask for negative
certifications similar to those that the underwriters demand in the standard
Rule lOb-5 opinion? This omission seems as striking as Sherlock Holmes's
dog that did not bark in the night.24 Several answers suggest themselves.
First, as just noted, ratings agencies face little competitive pressure or
liability, and hence, require only a pro forma opinion to assure that they can
escape liability. Second, the bar associations-acting like the classic
cartel-have tried to preclude requests for such a negative assurance in any
context other than the registered public offering (where it is too well
established to be abolished).25 Third, the accountants are under great
pressure from their clients to accept off-balance-sheet treatment and the
attorney's opinion helps them to reach a conclusion that they independently
desire to justify.
The above example of the Rule 1Ob-5 "negative assurance" opinion
(and its limited use) suggests that there is more that could reasonably be
asked of the law firm. For example, not only could the law firm be asked to
certify the absence of any material misrepresentation or omission, it could be
asked to give its affirmative assurance that in its judgment the transaction has
23. Indeed, Professor Mendales points out that the U.C.C. draws no "clear line between a true
sale and a transfer for security" (i.e., a secured loan). Mendales, supra note 15, at 782. But
precisely for this reason the intent behind the transaction may be critical.
24. ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES 336, 347
(Doubleday 1930) (1894).
25. See ABA Task Force on Securities Law Opinions, supra note 14, at 1513-14.
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a legitimate business purpose (i.e., one other than the suppression of
liabilities from the originator's balance sheet).
But how much can sensibly be asked of the law firm? At what point do
burdens become excessive? Now it is time to turn from the other parties to
the responsibilities of the attorney and the law firm.
II. What Responsibilities Should the Attorney Face?
Professor Schwarcz gets to the heart of the matter when he writes:
Lawyers issuing structured-finance opinions.., are neither acting as
securities lawyers nor expressing opinions on securities law. They
are, nevertheless, opining on matters that may impact, albeit
indirectly, disclosure to investors of corporate information. Should
these lawyers be responsible to the public for the ultimate use that is
made of their opinions, even if their opinions are neither incorrect nor
misleading on their face?
26
He answers that lawyers should not be held responsible for any negative
externalities so caused2 7 I agree that structured-finance counsel has no duty
to lecture the corporation about its overall level of law compliance or to in-
vestigate matters unrelated to the specific transaction, but this still leaves
open the legitimacy of the very transaction on which counsel is opining.
Here, let me subdivide my response into three parts: (a) what liabilities does
the attorney now face? (b) why is a "legitimate business justification"
relevant? and (c) what responsibilities--ethical or otherwise-should the
attorney recognize?
A. The Duty Not to Mislead
To an uncertain extent, Congress may have already answered Professor
Schwarcz's question as to the public duties of the attorney and given an
answer different than his. Although Professor Schwarcz gives some attention
to § 303(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("Improper Influence on Conduct of
Audits"), his analysis of it is largely skeptical. As he recognizes, this
provision could subject attorneys who advise auditors to liability to the SEC,
if their advice is "misleading." Specifically, § 303(a) states:
It shall be unlawful, in contravention of such rules or regulations as
the Commission shall prescribe as necessary and appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors, for any officer or
director of an issuer, or any other person acting under the direction
thereof to take any action to fraudulently influence, coerce,
manipulate, or mislead any independent public or certified accountant
26. Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 16-17.
27. Id. at 54 ("Because lawyers should have the right to issue third-party business law opinions
that help facilitate transactions that are not unlawful at the time the opinion is issued, this opinion
should not be subject to criticism and the lawyer issuing it should not be subject to liability.").
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engaged in the performance of an audit of the financial statements of
that issuer for the purpose of rendering such financial statements
materially misleading.28
Clearly, this language covers an attorney or law firm hired by the issuer
to give a true sale, nonconsolidation, or similar bankruptcy opinion if it is
relied upon by the auditor of the originator in deciding not to include the
liabilities of the special purpose entity on its parent's balance sheet.29
Although the word "fraudulently" in the above quotation would seem to re-
quire an intent to defraud before the attorney could be held liable, the SEC
apparently reads "fraudulently" to modify only the word "influence." The
SEC has adopted Rule 13b2-2 to implement § 303(a),30 and in the adopting
release, the Commission interpreted § 303 to apply to any person's action or
conduct "if that person knew or should have known that such action, if
successfil, could result in rendering the financial statement materially
misleading. '3 1 This is essentially a negligence standard, and it may require
the exercise of due care by the law firm to make certain that it does not
mislead.
The paradigmatic case in which § 303 will clearly be violated arises, for
example, when a litigation partner of a law firm is asked by the corporate
client to talk to the client's auditor about pending litigation. What the
corporate client wants is for the litigator to assure the auditor that the action
is meritless so that no reserve (or only a modest reserve) need be created by
the corporate client. Assume next that the attorney does so, downplaying the
plaintiffs prospect for success in casual, off-the-cuff, oral comments; as a
result, no reserve is required by the auditor. Eventually, plaintiffs win a $500
million recovery. On these facts, the SEC (but only the SEC) could find the
attorney to have violated § 303.32
If this is true, how different is it from this fact pattern when an attorney,
opining on a transfer of assets to an SPV, gives a true sale opinion, knowing
that the auditor will rely on this opinion in permitting the originator to re-
move liabilities associated with the transferred assets from its balance sheet?
To be sure, distinctions can be drawn, as the attorney's opinion in this exam-
ple does not misstate any facts (while the litigator's oral advice in the
preceding example may have). Nor is the auditor necessarily misled, even if
public investors will be. But, arguably, the attorney's opinion will still
28. 15 U.S.C. § 7242(a) (2005) (emphasis added).
29. See Improper Influence on Conduct of Audits, Exchange Act Release No. 34-47890, § I
(June 26, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-47890.htm.
30. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2 (2005).
31. Improper Influence on Conduct of Audits, supra note 29, § II.
32. The SEC has "exclusive authority to enforce" § 303 under § 303(b). 15 U.S.C.
§ 7242(b).
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"mislead" the auditor in the sense of causing him forseeably to reach an
erroneous result.
33
Of course, the Commission might also seek to impose liability on a law
firm on the ground that it "aided and abetted" a securities law violation. But
now it will have to show that the attorney "knowingly provided substantial
assistance" to the primary violator.34 Both Professor Schwarcz and I reach
the same conclusions when there is knowing assistance, but § 303 may
contemplate a negligence standard that in turn creates an affirmative duty to
investigate.
The common law may independently create a duty to investigate the
legitimacy of a transaction. Case law generally recognizes that the recipient
of a third-party opinion can sue the opinion writer for negligent
misrepresentation. At least one recent decision has found liability for failure
to discover an ongoing fraud investigation of a corporation where the law
firm gave an opinion that the corporation was not the subject of any litigation
or investigations and other lawyers at the law firm had worked to a limited
degree on defending the litigation.35 Clearly, the attorney has a duty to
investigate the facts before the attorney delivers an opinion to the third party.
The bottom-line issue thus becomes: what must be investigated?
B. The Relevance of "Legitimate Business Purpose"
Professor Schwarcz takes essentially a "just the facts, ma'am" approach
to opinion giving. Giving an opinion is a cut-and-dried affair: the client tells
the attorney the facts, and the attorney applies the law to those facts and
expresses a conclusion. In most contexts, this is, more or less, the process,
and moral lectures from the attorney are not appropriate. But the bankruptcy
context is distinctive. The goal of the transaction planners is to isolate and
insulate the special purpose entity and its collateral so that on a bankruptcy of
the parent or "originator" entity (1) their assets and liabilities cannot be
pooled, and (2) the parent or originator will not be seen as having any interest
in the collateral held by the special purpose entity. Thus, counsel is asked to
opine on both these questions. But the law is slippery on both. First, the
U.C.C. does not draw any distinction between a true sale and a transfer for
33. This possibility that a disclosure can be technically accurate but still incomplete and
misleading seems to be the core idea underlying United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir.
1969), a decision written by Judge Henry Friendly in which the Second Circuit upheld the criminal
conviction of two auditors who had certified financial statements as complying with GAAP. The
Second Circuit appeared to indicate in Simon that compliance with GAAP was not the requisite
standard, and that financial statements complying with them could still be materially misleading in
violation of Rule lOb-5. Note, however, that § 303 focuses only on misleading the auditor, not
investors.
34. See § 20(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e).
35. See Dean Foods Co. v. Pappathanasi, No. 01-2595 BLS, 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 571
(Super. Ct. Mass. Dec. 3, 2004). This case is discussed in Annual Review of the Law on Legal
Opinions, supra note 11, at 1061.
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security where the assets transferred consist of accounts or chattel paper,
categories that include the income-producing properties that underlie most
36thstructured-finance transactions. In fact, the same steps are taken under the
U.C.C. to effect a sale of such instruments as to perfect a secured loan
transaction. This uncertainty forces counsel to look outside the four corners
of the documents (which is, in part, why these opinions are so lengthy).
But if counsel must consider more and cannot rely on any bright-line
test under the U.C.C., the transaction's purpose seems very relevant. If the
transaction were intended simply to improve the originator's cosmetic
financial appearance, there is not the same indicia of an absolute and
irrevocable transfer of the property. Indeed, the transaction might be
unwound if circumstances changed. A similar point can be made about the
uncertainty surrounding the bankruptcy law on nonconsolidation. Courts
consolidate the parent and the special purpose entity based on equitable
factors,37 and the purpose of the transaction seems particularly relevant from
this perspective.
Ultimately, the attorney knows that the third-party recipients of the
attorney's opinion care greatly about the risk of consolidation. If a
transaction's lack of a legitimate business purpose increases this risk, then
third-party recipients who are injured by a consolidation may have the right
under existing law to hold a law firm liable for negligent misrepresentation if
the law firm failed to investigate this question adequately. Professor
Schwarcz would probably respond that the attorney made no
misrepresentation; rather, investors simply misinterpreted what the attorney
actually said. This is arguable, but the attorney either knew, or should have
known, that the attorney's opinion would mislead. From an ethical
perspective, this should be sufficient to find a violation. Given these risks,
the attorney seeking to inquire into the transaction's purpose is not an
intrusive busybody, but a professional seeking to fulfill the attorney's duty of
due care.
C. Aspirational Duties
Professor Schwarcz is clearly correct when he states that the attorney
cannot be required to withhold an opinion simply because the attorney
36. The term "chattel paper" includes a set of writings evidencing a monetary obligation and a
supporting security interest in, or lease of, specific personal property. See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(1 1)
(2004). Thus, a pool of receivables on car loans (a paradigmatic structured-finance transaction)
falls within this definition. This results in uncertainty because U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(28) then defines
the term "debtor" to include not only a person who owes payment on an obligation secured by
accounts receivable or chattel paper, but also a seller of such accounts or chattel paper. See
Mendales, supra note 15, at 782 n.209.
37. See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Colonial Realty Co., 966 F.2d 57, 58 (2d Cir. 1992)
(holding that because there is no prohibition explicit in the Bankruptcy Code, nor in the principles
of equity, a bankruptcy court may direct the substantive consolidation of the bankruptcy estates of
defendant debtors); Mendales, supra note 15, at 780-81 ("Substantive consolidation is a form of
nonstatutory equitable relief that courts impose on a case-by-case basis .... ").
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realizes that the client's conduct will result in negative externalities. Nor is it
efficient for the opining law firm to trace every step and research due
incorporation and corporate authority. Here, outside counsel can rely on the
general counsel or others.
But Professor Schwarcz's rationale for absolving the attorney from any
duty to make affirmative inquiry seems overbroad. Lawyers should not be
constrained from providing opinions to facilitate "lawful business
transactions," he argues, because they should not substitute their judgments
for those of their clients, in part because their "clients generally have more
and better information about the consequences of transactions, other than the
transaction's legality. 3 8 For the most part, I would agree. But he leaves
something important out here: the client's management is not only better
informed, it is also more self-interested. Given these conflicts, the tradeoff
between the attorney's judgment and that of the client is less certain than he
suggests, because of the likelihood of agency costs. This is why legal ethics
(and not just § 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley in the case of securities attorneys)
requires the lawyer to go up the corporate ladder and report misconduct by
the corporation's agents to the board.39 Thus, if the attorney is aware that a
structured-finance transaction will result in a material misstatement of the
originator's financial statements, the attorney has a fairly clear-cut obligation
to protest to the board, both under generally prevailing standards and
especially under § 307.
But, if no warning signals are evident, should the attorney still be under
an obligation to inquire into the transaction's purpose or legitimacy? For the
reasons earlier discussed, sheer professionalism may require the attorney to
inquire into the purpose of the transaction in structured-finance offerings
because no clear line separates "true sales" from secured loans-and hence
motive is relevant. But this is a narrow and technical response. Even outside
this narrow context, legal ethics should mandate a minimal inquiry-not into
the corporation's conduct in general, but into the legitimacy of the specific
transaction. Why? Because on a cost-benefit basis, such an inquiry is
simple, and its absence invites the misuse of the attorney's services. Thus, I
believe Professor Schwarcz's position falls short in two respects.
First, under his approach, the attorney may not proceed in the face of
warning signals and red flags but has no affirmative duty of inquiry. Of
38. Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 28.
39. In August 2003, the American Bar Association revised Model Rule 1.13 (Organization as
Client) of its Model Rules of Professional Conduct to eliminate possible ambiguity in this regard.
As revised, Model Rule 1.13(b) now instructs the attorney who learns facts "from which a
reasonable lawyer... would conclude that an officer, employee or other person associated with the
organization... intends to act... in a manner related to the representation that is a violation of a
legal obligation to the organization" that it is the attorney's duty to "proceed as is reasonably
necessary in the best interests of the organization." See Report of the American Bar Association
Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, 59 BUS. LAW. 145, 168 (2003). The commentary to this
rule then indicates that "up the ladder" reporting is presumptively required.
2005)
Texas Law Review
course, I agree with Professor Schwarcz that an attorney may not proceed in
the face of red flags. But the concept of "warning signals" or "red flags" is
not easy to define. A clearer, bright-line standard is preferable because it
gives the attorney fairer notice on an ex ante basis. From this perspective, a
better rule would require the attorney not only to halt in the face of red flags,
but also to ascertain that the transaction has a legitimate business purpose.
This spares everyone the costs of an ex post determination as to whether the
attorney culpably missed or ignored warning signals. "Legitimate business
purpose" would include any lawful purpose, other than the cosmetic
manipulation of the originator's financial statements. Reducing the cost of
capital is the quintessential legitimate business purpose (here, we agree), but
"achieving an accounting treatment permitted by GAAP'4° is not. To see
why not, it is only necessary to return to Judge Friendly's decision in United
States v. Simon.41 As Simon held, it is possible to comply with GAAP while
still falling well short of the full and fair disclosure standard mandated by the
federal securities laws.42 Determining that there is such a legitimate purpose
places very little burden on the structured-finance specialist. Indeed, if the
corporation's general counsel cannot help the attorney to see such a purpose
quickly, this may be itself a warning signal. The failure to take such a simple
step could also be seen as negligent conduct that had the consequence of
misleading the auditor in violation of § 303.
Second, the attorney should be under an obligation to take reasonable
affirmative steps to integrate all the knowledge possessed by the attorney's
law firn. 4 3  It is, after all, the law firm that gives the opinion, not the
individual attorney. Sometimes, the law firm acts as counsel to the
corporation and possesses additional knowledge that may give rise to
warning signals. Other times, even without acting as counsel to the
corporation, the law firm may have advised on earlier transactions and thus
may realize that the instant transaction is part of a pattern of continuing
transactions that are masking material liabilities. For example, if the law
firm has acted as counsel for multiple structured-finance transactions by the
same originator and has given such opinions on multiple transactions that
collectively removed $10 billion in debt from the originator's balance sheet
(or, let's say, 50% of its total consolidated liabilities), then the attorney
knows much more (and also has a likely § 307 problem) than if this were the
first transaction in which the law firm acted as counsel retained by, or on
behalf of, the originator.
40. Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 34.
41. 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969) (upholding the criminal conviction of accountants even though
the financial statements apparently complied with GAAP).
42. Id. at 805-06.
43. Indeed, the civil law already seems to impose this obligation. Thus, an attorney who had no
knowledge of a tax investigation of his corporate client was held liable for negligent
misrepresentation because other lawyers in his firm were so aware. See Dean Foods Co. v.
Pappathanasi, 18 Mass. L. Rptr. 598 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2004).
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III. Conclusion
Professor Schwarcz and I share much common ground. We both agree
that clients want champions, not chaperones. But the position of the law firm
giving a third-party opinion is very different from that of the attorney advis-
ing his or her own client. In imposing higher duties in this context, we are
not paternalistically interfering with an actual attorney-client relationship,
but we are protecting third parties who have reasonably relied and may have
had no opportunity to bargain over the opinion's terms and scope.
As a practical matter, it must be recognized that accounting
irregularities are likely to be an enduring feature of the landscape of the
corporate world. Once securities fraud is uncovered, the odds become high
that the SEC (or a court) will recharacterize the entire transaction and find
either the transaction not to be a true sale or not to consolidate the various
entities. 44 As a result, the counsel delivering the third-party opinion cannot
reasonably ignore this nontrivial risk as to whether the transaction has a
legitimate business purpose. The corporate client's desire to cosmetically
alter its financial statements is a fact of life that requires no special notice to
put the prudent attorney on guard. As the post-Enron cases accumulate, it is
also becoming clearer that when a transaction is tainted with fraud, the future
solvency of all the participants is threatened.45
Against this backdrop, the standard here proposed that the opining
law firm must determine that the instant transaction has a legitimate business
purpose (other than the accounting impact) is not just a prudential rule of
ethics. It may be a rule of self-preservation.
Finally, this essay has observed that bar associations sometimes (and
maybe often) behave as cartels seeking to protect their members' interests.
But the irony is that these efforts may backfire over the long run and cause
the loss of the bar's own reputational capital. A clearer normative principle
than the traditional "hired gun" rules of the advocate should guide the bar
with regard to those contexts where the attorney is acting as a gatekeeper and
inviting investors to rely on it. That principle should recognize that, to the
extent the attorney has invited reliance (as the attorney certainly does in the
third-party opinion context where public investors are the recipients), legal
ethics should seek to protect the opinion-recipient from being reasonably
44. This result could also be justified on the grounds that the transaction was a fraudulent
conveyance. Assuming that the originator later files for reorganization, the transaction could be
avoided as fraudulent if the originator received less than reasonably equivalent fair value for the
exchange and the transfer left it without adequate capital for its business. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 548(a)(2) (2004).
45. For a recent example, see Court Approves $474 Million Settlement in UC-Led Class Action
Against Dynegy Inc., 6 Class Action Litig. Rep. (BNA) 510 (July 22, 2005) (reporting approval of a
class action settlement by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas). This
settlement related to Dynegy's "Project Alpha," which the SEC had criticized in an earlier
enforcement proceeding. According to the SEC, Dynegy had used special purpose entities to report
as cash flow from operations what "was in actuality nothing more than a loan." Id.
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misled (even by a technically accurate opinion).46 The rationale for such a
principle is that only under such an ethical regime can the attorney resist
client pressure and protect the reputational capital of the bar. For decades,
the bar associations have sought to protect attorneys from the users of their
opinions. It is time today for the bar to protect attorneys instead from clients
demanding misleading (but technically accurate) opinions.
46. I do not mean that the opinion must be comprehensible to the dumbest recipient who will
rely on it; reasonable reliance should focus, as always, on the hypothetical reasonable investor.
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